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Comments
Pleading the Statute of Frauds or Statutes of
Limitations in Pennsylvania: A Need for Reform
The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide two distinct
methods for raising as a defense the bar of the Statute of Frauds or
a statute of limitations. Every such defense may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense under the caption, "New Matter,"' to be consid-
ered on a motion for summary judgment 2 or at trial; but certain of
these statutes may also be raised and considered on a preliminary
objection in the nature of a special demurrer.' For counsel and court
alike, problems arise in determining which statutes may be pleaded
earlier as a preliminary objection. The rules and the cases purport
to apply a distinction based upon the nature and effect of the statu-
tory provision in question. However, the conceptual fiber of this
distinction has proven too elusive in distinguishing the many simi-
lar statutes. As a result, the bar of the Statute of Frauds or a statute
of limitations is often improperly or inefficiently raised.4
I. UNDERSTANDING THE BASIS FOR DISTINCTION
A. Introduction
The primary cause of confusion in this area of practice is a con-
ceptual analysis and classification of the statutes which determines
when the bar of a particular statute can be invoked.' To understand
1. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1030.
2. See id. 1035.
3. See id. 1017(b). The applicability of the statute must appear on the face of the com-
plaint or counterclaim.
4. The arguments and suggestions for reform in this comment are made in recognition of
the need for commentary to aid in the difficult task of formulating effective procedural rules.
See Wright, Modern Pleading and the Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 911-12
(1953).
5. PA. R. Civ. P. 1017(b)(4) provides that a preliminary objection in the nature of a
demurrer "may include the bar of a nonwaivable statute of limitations or frauds which bars
or destroys the right of action and the applicability of which appears on the face of the
complaint or counterclaim. ... Id. (emphasis added). However, the wording chosen by
the rule does not provide a clear basis for discriminating among the various statutes. For
example, is a "nonwaivable" statute one "which bars or destroys the right of action"? As
399
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this analysis, it is necessary to review the early case law from which
it originated. An interpretive distinction developed in the Pennsyl-
vania cases dealing with the provisions of the Statute of Frauds and
the statutes of limitations between (1) those enactments which af-
firmatively conditioned the legal rights subject to the statute, and
(2) those statutes which had no such independent effect. For proce-
dural purposes, this distinction was necessary to determine which
statutes could be invoked at trial though not pleaded. Statutes in
the former category were deemed to have substantive effect even if
not raised in the pleadings and thus could be raised at trial, whereas
statutes in the latter were considered permissive defenses which
would be waived if not raised in the pleadings. ' Thus, those statutes
of limitations which were interpreted as conditions put by law on
the existence of the legal right, often labeled statutes of repose,
placed upon the plaintiff I the "mandatory" burden of showing that
the action was timely, and could be taken advantage of by the
defendant at trial though not pleaded.' Conversely, a true statute
of limitations did not of itself limit the plaintiff's right to bring the
action within the prescribed period. Such statutes could only be
availed of when pleaded.' This distinction similarly developed for
the provisions of the Statute of Frauds; those which were "substan-
tive," rendering oral agreements "unenforceable," could be invoked
at trial even if they had not been pleaded, since these statutes
affirmatively required proof of compliance. 10
indicated in the text, the historical development of the distinction employed by rule
1017(b)(4) may provide a better understanding of the standard adopted under the rule.
6. See 4 M. LEWIS, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 101-04 (rev. ed. 1955).
7. The terms "plaintiff" and "defendant" will often be used in this comment. It should
be noted that their usage is predicated on the assumption that a complaint is the subject of
inquiry, and that the same principles apply if a counterclaim is concerned.
8. E.g., Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 45-46, 1 A.2d 839, 842-43 (1938).
Bringing suit within the period of limitations was considered to be a condition precedent to
the existence of the legal right. For an excellent discussion, see Swartz v. Great American
Ins. Co., 65 York 91, 78 Pa. D. & C. 376 (C.P. 1951).
9. E.g., Barclay v. Barclay, 206 Pa. 307, 310, 55 A. 985, 986 (1903):
It is not a defense absolute of which the court will take judicial notice on the plaintiffs
presentation of his case, either in his declaration or at the trial, for if the defendant
does not choose to make it, it is not a part of the case at all.
10. E.g., Bayard v. Pennsylvania Knitting Mills Corp., 290 Pa. 79, 86-87, 137 A. 910, 913
(1927); Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie, 270 Pa. 221, 113 A. 202 (1921).
There is a vital distinction between cases where the claim was originally enforceable
by suit, but recovery thereof may or may not have been lost by a failure to bring it
within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations; and those, like the present,
where the claim never was enforceable unless the statutory requirements were ob-
Vol. 14: 399
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At the time, this distinction served another procedural purpose.
A technique was needed for determining which provisions of the
Statute of Frauds or statutes of limitations could be raised by de-
murrer, and it was felt that this method 6f interpreting the statutes
was an appropriate manner of discriminating among the various
provisions." The reasoning behind this development was logical and
perhaps inevitable, given its narrow premise. In Pennsylvania, a
demurrer could be sustained only if the complaint failed to state a
cause of action upon which recovery could be had. A complaint
which failed to show that the conditions of a mandatory or
substantive statute had been met failed to state a legally sufficient
cause of action. Accordingly, such a statute could properly be raised
by demurrer. Conversely, those statutes which did not affirmatively
condition the legal right had no independent effect on the complaint
or counterclaim. These statutes did not require allegations of com-
pliance, and the complaint nevertheless stated a cause upon which
relief might be granted. Consequently, such statutes could not be
raised at the demurrer stage of the proceedings."
B. Later Development
When the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure were first
adopted,'3 the appropriate provisions were interpreted as requiring
served. Under the former, the facts necessary to take the case out of the statute need
not be set forth; under the latter . . . they must be averred in order to show a recovery
may be had under the statute. Were the question res nova we would hesitate ere we
decided not to so require in both classes of cases.
Id. at 223, 113 A. at 203 (citations omitted) (construing Sales Act of May 19, 1915, No. 241,
§ 4, [1915] Laws of Pa. 543).
11. See, e.g., Leonard v. Martling, 378 Pa. 339, 106 A.2d 585 (1954).
12. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure have adopted the system of pleading
labeled "fact-pleading." See PA. R. Civ. P. 1019(a): "The material facts on which a cause of
action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form." For those conver-
sant with the distinction between "cause of action" and "claim," see, e.g., Garcia v. Hilton
Hotels Int'l, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951), the complaint must establish the former.
However, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure apparently fail to distinguish the two.
Compare PA. R. Civ. P. 1019(a) ("cause of action"), with PA. R. Civ. P. 1032 ("claim").
Consequently the two will be used interchangeably in this comment. The essential principle
remains that pleading in Pennsylvania is "fact-pleading."
13. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure governing Actions at Law were first
adopted June 25, 1946, to become effective January 1, 1947, pursuant to the powers granted
to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 61-66 (1962). See also
PA. CONST. art. V, § 10. Prior to the adoption of the rules, procedure was governed by a series
of Pennyslvania Practice Acts, e.g., Act of May 14, 1915, No. 202, [1915] Laws of Pa. 483,
and by the common law forms of practice and procedure.
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that all defenses of the Statute of Frauds or statutes of limitations
be pleaded as affirmative defenses under the heading "New Mat-
ter."' 4 It was felt that no distinction was intended between statutes
which affirmatively conditioned the right and those which did not.'"
This position was logical, since rule 1030 provided that defenses of
the Statute of Frauds or statutes of limitations "shall be pleaded in
a responsive pleading under the heading 'New Matter.' "1 A literal
reading of the rules precluded raising these statutory defenses by
preliminary objection. 7
This simple view did not prevail for long. Lower court cases indi-
cated that the distinction established prior to the adoption of the
rules had survived, 8 and in Leonard v. Martling,9 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania confirmed these indications. The precise
issue in Leonard was whether the relevant bar of the Statute of
Frauds20 could be raised at trial even though it had not been
pleaded.2 ' The court considered rule 103222 controlling. This rule
provided that any defense or objection would be waived if not
pleaded by preliminary objection or answer; however, failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted could nevertheless
be raised at trial. 23 Since the pertinent inquiry concerned the suffi-
ciency of the complaint, the court resorted to the historical distinc-
tion. Reasoning that the statute at bar was a limitation "upon the
14. Cohen v. Weiner, 66 Montg. 306, 73 Pa. D. & C. 477 (C.P. 1950); cf. Martin v. Wilson,
371 Pa. 529, 92 A.2d 193 (1952).
15. Compare Cohen v. Weiner, 66 Montg. 306, 73 Pa. D. & C. 477 (C.P. 1950) (Sales Act
of May 19, 1915, No. 241, § 4, [19151 Laws of Pa. 543, may not be pleaded as preliminary
objection), with Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie, 270 Pa. 221, 113 A. 202 (1921) (same act
may be raised by demurrer).
16. PA. R. Cw. P. 1030, quoted in Cohen v. Weiner, 66 Montg. 306, 307, 73 Pa. D. & C.
477, 479 (C.P. 1950).
17. It would seem that in the absence of an effective summary judgment procedure, this
required defendants to wait until trial to prevail on a legal defense. PA. R. Civ. P. 1035,
permitting summary judgment, was first promulgated in 1966.
18. Swartz v. Great American Ins. Co., 65 York 91, 78 Pa. D. & C. 376 (C.P. 1951); Dyno
v. Rafferty, 52 Lack. Jur. 190, 77 Pa. D. & C. 47 (C.P. 1951).
19. 378 Pa. 339, 106 A.2d 585 (1954).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 3 (1967).
21. The defendant had moved for judgment on the pleadings in the nature of a statutory
demurrer on the grounds of the Statute of Frauds before the jury was sworn in. 378 Pa. at
341, 106 A.2d at 586.
22. PA. R. Civ. P. 1032.
23. 378 Pa. at 342, 106 A.2d at 586, citing PA. R. Civ. P. 1032. For other exceptions to the
rule of waiver, see PA. R. Civ. P. 1032.
Vol. 14: 399
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judicial authority to provide remedies,"24 the court concluded that
the statute was substantive. A complaint which did not establish
that the contract sued upon met the requirements of such a statute
did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. As before
the promulgation of the rules, failure to plead such a statute would
not preclude the defendant from raising it at trial."'
The court's rationale in Leonard necessarily implied that sub-
stantive statutes could beraised by demurrer." Despite this, lower
courts were still split over whether any bar of the Statute of Frauds
or statute of limitations could be raised by preliminary objection.27
Moreover, even accepting that some statutes might be raised by
demurrer, it was not clear that only substantive or mandatory ones
would share such an honored status. The supreme court obtained
the opportunity to directly address these issues in Brown v. Hahn,2"
and in articulating the appropriate procedure, held that only those
statutes which independently operated to bar the plaintiff's cause
of action, by placing mandatory conditions upon a showing for re-
covery, could be pleaded by preliminary objection. 9 The court ex-,
24. 378 Pa. at 343, 106 A.2d at 586.
25. Two important points should be noted in regard to Leonard. First, as authority for
the proposition that the Statute of Frauds provision before the court placed an affirmative
condition upon recovery, the court cited In re Purman's Estate, 334 Pa. 238, 5 A.2d 906 (1939).
In that case, the supreme court expressly declared that, while PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 3 (1967)
placed a limitation upon the judicial authority to afford a remedy, it did not render the
transaction invalid; only when an action was brought on the oral promise did the statute
apply to render the agreement unenforceable. 334 Pa. at 245, 5 A.2d at 909. Second, the
Leonard court was cautious to distinguish Sferra v. Urling, 328 Pa. 161, 195 A. 422 (1937),
which had held that PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1 (1967) could not be raised for the first time
on appeal. The Leonard court felt that since the defendants in Sferra had failed to bring the
statute to the attention of the court at any stage of the trial proceedings, they had clearly
waived their right to plead the defense. 378 Pa. at 343-44, 106 A.2d at 586-87; accord, PA. R.
Civ. P. 1032.
26. 378 Pa. at 343, 106 A.2d at 586, citing, e.g., Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie, 270 Pa.
221, 113 A. 202 (1921).
27. See Brown v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42, 49 n.6, 213 A.2d 342, 345 n.6 (1965).
28. 419 Pa. 42, 213 A.2d 342 (1965).
29. The supreme court expressed the distinction and its application to the pleading prob-
lem lucidly:
Whether the Statute of Frauds must be raised only as an affirmative defense under
Rule 1030 or may be raised by preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
depends initially upon the language and nature of the provisions of the particular
Statute of Frauds involved.
In the promulgation of the Rules of Civil Procedure it was intended to retain the
historic distinction between those statutes which affect the right of a plaintiff to bring
an action and those statutes which merely present the defendant with a permissive
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pressly adopted the historical distinction.3 0
The Brown court aptly illustrated the distinction by citing and
discussing Leonard as a case involving a statute' which could be
raised by demurrer. This conclusion was based on the observation
that the statute in Leonard "provided 'no action shall be brought'
upon an oral guaranty unless it be in writing or there be some
written memorandum thereof."3 Such a provision went directly to
the right to-bring the action and was a substantive rule of law.
When called upon to apply the distinction to the case at hand
however, the Brown court deferred to Sferra v. Urling.33 Stating that
Sferra construed this very Statute of Frauds34 "as not affecting the
right of a plaintiff to maintain the action but simply affording a
permissive defense to the defendant,"35 the Brown court held that
the particular statute Could not be raised as a preliminary objection.
However, it is questionable whether Sferra Construed the statute in
this manner. The issue in Sferra was whether the statute could be
raised for the first time on appeal. The Sferra court reasoned that
it could be so raised only if it acted to "outlaw" the oral transaction
in question, rendering the latter void in all respects.3 1 While holding
that the statute was not of this nature, the Sferra court expressly
acknowledged that the statute could nevertheless be a substantive
defense which might be waived by the defendant if not asserted. Stated otherwise, if
the particular Statute of Frauds operates to bar or destroy the plaintiff's right of
action, irrespective of the action of the defendant, such statute may be raised by
preliminary objections under Rule 1017(b); however, if the particular Statute of Frauds
merely gives the defendant a waivable defense, the plaintiff will have stated a cause
of action to which the defendant may, if he chooses, defend on the ground of the statute
and, under such circumstances, the statute must be asserted under "New Matter"
under Rule 1030.
Id. at 46-47, 213 A.2d at 344.
30. See notes 5-12 and text accompanying supra. See also Leonard v. Martling, 378 Pa.
339, 342-44, 106 A.2d 585, 586 (1954), and cases cited therein.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 3 (1967).
32. 419 Pa. at 47, 213 A.2d at 345.
33. 328 Pa. 161, 195 A. 422 (1937).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1 (1967).
35. 419 Pa. at 48, 213 A.2d at 345.
36. See McMeekin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 348 Pa. 568, 571, 36 A.2d 430, 431
(1944):
AfIer a trial on the merits, no defect of pleading, which could have been raised before
trial, will be fatal to the judgment, unless it is shown to have injuriously affected the
trial.
See also Brandon v. McKinney, 233 Pa. 481, 82 A. 764 (1912); Eckert v. Schoch, 155 Pa. 530,
26 A. 654 (1893); note 25 supra.
Vol. 14: 399
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rule of law limiting the judicial authority to provide a remedy. 7
Even such statutes could be waived if not pleaded before the close
of trial proceedings.3 1 Sferra left unanswered the question whether
the applicable Statute of Frauds was mandatory, and it was the
duty of the court in Brown to accurately apply its test to the statute
at hand.31 While the Brown court's failure to do so seriously affects
the soundness of the result, the test espoused is capable of more
successful application.
In 1969, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure were amended
to explicitly incorporate the practice and reasoning condoned by
Brown." Rule 1017(b) now reads:
(b) Preliminary objections are available to any party and
are limited to
(4) a demurrer, which may include the bar of a nonwaiv-
able statute of limitations or frauds which bars or destroys
the right of action and the applicability of which appears
on the face of the complaint or counterclaim .... ,i
Accompanying amendments were made to rules 1030 and 1045(b)
indicating that the Statute of Frauds and statutes of limitations are
to be raised by new matter in the answer only if not already properly
raised by preliminary objection.
37. 328 Pa. at 167-69 & n.4, 195 A. at 425-27 & n.4.
38. Id. at 168 n.4, 195 A. at 426 n.4; accord, PA. R. Civ. P. 1032. The reasoning behind
requiring the defendant to raise such a defense during some stage of the trial proceedings is
well founded. Unless the statute declares absolutely invalid the underlying oral agreement,
the defendant should be required to put the plaintiff on notice that he intends to plead its
protections. The plaintiff could reasonably believe that the defendant was admitting to the
existence of the contract, and fail to produce evidence which might take the agreement out
of the statute. See American Prods. Co. v. Refining Co., 275 Pa. 332, 119 A. 414 (1923), where
the court permitted a mandatory provision of the Statute of Frauds to be raised after verdict
on a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto only if plaintiff were permitted to show proof
of the inapplicability of the statute.
39. See Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131, 135, 289 A.2d 463, 466 (1972).
40. See P. AMRAM, GOODRICH-AMRAM STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE Rule 1017 at 245
(Supp. 1&2 March, 1976) [hereinafter cited as GOODRICH-AMRAM]; accord, e.g., Ziemba v.
Hagerty, 436 Pa. 179, 180-81, 259 A.2d 876 (1969).
41. PA. R. Civ. P. 1017(b).
1976
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II. APPLICATION OF THE HISTORICAL DISTINCTION
The confusion apparent to the supreme court in Brown has not
been diffused, and in fact, seems to be more prevalent now than
before.42 This generally stems from a misunderstanding of the "his-
torical distinction" endorsed by Brown or from a failure to appropri-
ately apply the difficult conceptual distinction to the statute in
question. In discussing the various cases in which rule 1017(b)(4)
has been applied, the development leading to the present language
of the rule must be remembered. The policy of Brown carrying over
the historical distinction should prevail whenever doubt exists as to
the meaning of rule 1017(b)(4).
A. What is a "Nonwaivable" Statute?
In considering the scope of rule 1017(b)(4), emphasis has been
consistently placed on whether the particular statute is "nonwaiva-
ble." 3 Since the term is not self-defining but varies with context,
courts and lawyers have struggled with its meaning. It has been
pointed out that this criterion seems unnecessary and is confusing
in light of rule 1032 which provides that all defenses and objections
with limited exceptions are waived unless pleaded.44 The solution to
this apparent dilemma and the key to an understanding of what is
meant by a "nonwaivable" statute lies in one of these exceptions to
rule 1032. "[T]he defense of failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted ' 45 may be raised until the close of trial. Such
a defense is "nonwaivable" in the sense that, though it may not
have been raised in the pleadings, its benefits will not be lost until
the completion of trial proceedings. The historical distinction, it will
be recalled, recognized mandatory or substantive statutes as requir-
ing plaintiff's compliance with certain conditions as a prerequisite
to recovery. When applicable and not satisfied, these statutes re-
sulted in a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, and were similarly "nonwaivable" for purposes of rule
42. I must respectfully disagree with Justice Pomeroy's assertion in Blumer v. Dorfman,
447 Pa. 131, 136, 289 A.2d 463, 466-67 (1972), to the contrary.
43. E.g., Economy Bank v. Hickory Corral Enterprises, Inc., 32 Beaver 56, 57, 55 Pa. D.
& C.2d 370, 372 (C.P. 1972); Yohey v. Lacoe, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 448, 449-50 (C.P. Colum. Co.
1971).
44. Allwein v. Wilt, 13 Lebanon 198 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
45. PA. R. Civ. P. 1032.
Vol. 14: 399
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1032.46 To interpret "nonwaivable" under rule 1017(b)(4) in con-
junction with rule 1032 comports with the premise of Brown-
preserving the historical distinction.
B. The Goodrich-Amram Approach
It has been suggested that rule 1017(b)(4) establishes a three-
pronged test; only a statute (1) which cannot be waived, (2) which
destroys the plaintiff's right of action, and (3) the applicability of
which appears on the face of the complaint or counterclaim, *can be
raised by preliminary objection. 4
Addressing the portions of this test in increasing order of complex-
ity, initially it can be seen that the final requisite is clearly correct.
Rule 1017(b)(4) explicitly requires that the facts triggering the ap-
plication of the statutory defense appear on the face of the claim.
Otherwise, a factual issue would exist which could not appropriately
be disposed of by preliminary objection.48
In contrast, the second requisite appears inaccurate, for the plain
language of rule 1017(b)(4) includes any statute which "bars or
destroys the right of action."49 Bypassing this difficulty for the
moment, it becomes clear that any requirement that the statute bar
46. See Leonard v. Martling, 378 Pa. 339, 106 A.2d 585 (1954).
47. GOODRICH-AMRAM, supra note 40, Rule 1017 at 245 (Supp. 1&2 March, 1976); accord,
Stoltzfus v. Haus, 334 A.2d 738, 741 (Pa. Super. 1975). See Mikula v. Harrisburg Poly-
clinic Hosp., 94 Dauph. 328, 58 Pa. D. & C.2d 125 (C.P. 1972); Rusch v. Evans, 53 Westmore-
land 173, 176-77 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
48. If, given the facts alleged by the plaintiff the statute did not apply, it is obvious that
the statute could not bar the claim of itself. If the statute were to be pleaded by the defendant,
he would have to allege facts which would make it applicable. This would raise an issue of
fact.
While PA. R. Civ. P. 1028(c) provides for the taking of evidence whenever factual issues
are raised by preliminary objection, the clear intent of rules 1017 and 1028 is that evidence
not be taken to determine the applicability of the Statute of Frauds or a statute of limitations.
Rather, such a procedure is designed to aid, for example, in the determination of jurisdic-
tional objections, where factual issues could often arise and be dispositive. See PA. R. Civ. P.
1017(b).
49. PA. R. Civ. P. 1017(b)(4) (emphasis added). However, it will be admitted that the
actual holding of Brown if accepted as correct justifies the assertion that the statute must
destroy the right of action. See notes 28-39 and text accompanying supra. But if it is true
that the statute must destory the right of action, Leonard v. Martling, 378 Pa. 339, 106 A.2d
585 (1954) is inconsistent, since the statute therein did not destroy the cause of action and it
was stated that it could be raised by demurrer. See notes 19-25 and text accompanying supra.
Finally, to require that the statute "destroy" the cause of action would be plainly inconsistent
with the historical distinction adopted by Brown as it has been applied to some statutory
provisions which do not destroy a cause of action but merely bar recovery (no cause of action
exists) unless compliance with the statutory mandate is alleged.
1976
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or destroy the claim is superfluous to the requirement of the rule
that the statute be "nonwaivable." As previously discussed, a "non-
waivable" statute for purposes of rule 1017(b)(4) is one which will
not be waived by failure to plead so long as it is raised before the
termination of trial proceedings.'" These statutes are limited to
those which result in a failure to state a sufficient claim.' Only
mandatory or substantive statutes have this effect, and each of
these by its nature "bars or destroys the right of action.""2 The
language to this effect in the rule must be regarded merely as rein-
forcing the requirement that the statute be "nonwaivable."
The first portion of the Goodrich-Amram test requires that the
statute be one "which cannot be waived." This parallels the tend-
ency of courts to determine the procedural attributes of a statute by
inquiring whether it is "waivable," reasoning that if a "nonwaiva-
ble" statute can be pleaded as a preliminary objection a "waivable"
one cannot. 3 Accordingly, the inquiry is whether a particular stat-
ute "is capable of being waived."54 Both of these standards, how-
ever, fail to indicate what type of capability is involved. For in-
stance, a party can waive the protection of any provision of the
Statute of Frauds by admitting in writing or under oath to the
existence of the oral agreement.5" Yet certain of these statutes have
50. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1032.
51. Id.
52. Id. 1017(b)(4).
53. E.g., Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131, 135, 289 A.2d 463, 466 (1972); Royal Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Tunnelton Mining Co., 444 Pa. 105, 107, 109, 282 A.2d 384, 385, 386 (1971); Stoltzfus
v. Haus, 334 A.2d 738, 741 (Pa. Super. 1975); McCleary v. Barrow, 87 York 21 (Pa. C.P. 1973);
Spanard v. Duquesne Light Co., 118 Pitt. L.J. 354, 355 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. 1970).
54. Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131, 135, 289 A.2d 463, 466 (1972).
55. See Sferra v. Urling, 328 Pa. 161, 167, 195 A. 422, 425 (1937), and cases cited therein.
The admission would clearly be a sufficient memorandum of the agreement: "[U]nder a
statute designed to guard against fraud and perjury in oral contracts there can be no danger
when the contract is admitted, since it is not within the mischief intended to be guarded
against." Id. See also Leonard v. Martling, 378 Pa. 339, 106 A.2d 585 (1954). Only under
statutes which totally destroy any legal relationship could the converse be true.
In Williams v. Moodhard, 341 Pa. 273, 19 A.2d 101 (1941), it was held that an oral trust in
contravention of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2 (1967) would become valid and enforceable if
admitted in the course of litigation by the trustee. In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Diamond
Coal & Coke Co., 234 Pa. 100, 83 A. 54 (1912), that very statute was held to be a limitation
on judicial authority to provide a remedy, requiring the plaintiff to show compliance as a
condition to recovery. And even those statutes of limitation which are mandatory conditions
upon recovery can be waived in the sense that the conduct or declarations of the parties may
toll the running of the statute. See Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super 38, 46, 1
A.2d 839, 843 (1938). See generally Suchan v. Swope, 357 Pa. 16, 53 A.2d 116 (1947); Zlotziver
1976 Comment
been deemed "nonwaivable." 56 In this context, the meanings of
"waivable" and "nonwaivable" can become complementary only if
"waivable" statutes are limited to those which will be involuntarily
waived under rule 1032 when not pleaded as a defense or objection,
and if "nonwaivable" ones are deemed those "which will not be
waived" under such circumstances. This approach, while consistent
with the earlier discussion of "nonwaivable," has not been expressed
by the courts; instead, for example, statutes have been labeled
"waivable" upon a showing that the defense may be voluntarily
waived. 7
C. The Historical Approach
It is encouraging to note that some courts have accurately applied
the historical distinction adopted by the rules in determining when
a particular statutory defense could be raised. In Bellotti v.
Spaeder,5 the supreme court indicated that the statute of limita-
tions in question could not be raised by demurrer because it did not
v. Zlotziver, 355 Pa. 299, 49 A.2d 779 (1946); Shaffer v. Shaffer, 344 Pa. 158, 23 A.2d 883
(1942); Metzger v. Metzger, 338 Pa. 564, 14 A.2d 285 (1940).
56. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 3 (1967). See Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131, 289 A.2d
463 (1972); notes 19-25 and text accompanying supra.
57. This has seemed particularly true where statutes of limitation are concerned. See
notes 87-98 and text accompanying infra.
One caveat must be made in regard to what has just been said. In the development of this
distinction between statutes based upon nature and effect, courts have seemed more willing
to interpret the Statute of Frauds provisions as substantive conditions on enforceability and
less likely to interpret the various statutes of limitation as mandatory conditions upon recov-
ery. See 3 M. LEWIS, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 162-63, 223-24 (1952). Generally, only
those statutes of limitations which were part of the statute granting the right were deemed
mandatory. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 871 (1952) (Workmen's Compensation Act); see
Overmiller v. D.E. Horn & Co., 191 Pa. Super. 562, 159 A.2d 245 (1960). Often these were
described as destroying the right of action, and there are intimations in the opinions that they
are expressions of legislative intent which cannot be voluntarily waived after the period has
run. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Fenton Storage Co. v. McClane, 154 Pa. Super. 246,
248, 35 A.2d 745, 745-46 (1944). Every such statute will be nonwaivable in the sense that
failure to plead will not affect the ability of the court to consider the defense at trial.
Following this portion of the historical distinction, some recent opinions have indicated
that the test under rule 1017(b)(4) is whether the statute is a "defense absolute" of which
the court can take judicial notice. E.g., Stoltzfus v. Haus, 334 A.2d 738, 740 (Pa. Super. 1975).
It is suggested that while this may be an accurate description for some statutes of limitation,
it is not the appropriate test for determining when such statutes may be raised. It is but a
result of application of the appropriate test: whether the statute places a mandatory condition
upon recovery such that failure to allege avoidance is a failure to state a legally sufficient
cause of action.
58. 433 Pa. 219, 249 A.2d 343 (1969).
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place a mandatory condition upon the right to recover.59 Similarly,
lower court cases have lucidly applied the "substantive" test to
determine whether a particular Statute of Frauds could be pleaded
as a preliminary objection. " Other cases however have employed the
distinction endorsed by the rules improperly. A primary cause of
much misdirection has been a failure to accurately analyze the sta-
tutory language to determine whether it places mandatory condi-
tions upon the right of recovery. Instead, too great a reliance has
been placed upon cases which have themselves not adequately re-
solved this issue." For example, in Holzer v. Masters,2 the court of
common pleas was asked to determine that the statute of limita-
tions at bar 3 was nonwaivable and could be raised by preliminary
objection. The court declined to so hold, basing its decision on four
inapplicable supreme court decisions. While each of these four deci-
sions had addressed the propriety of raising the statute of limita-
tions by demurrer, none had dealt with the specific statutory provi-
sion in question. 4 The court's failure in Holzer to attempt a rea-
soned analysis of the nature and effect of the statute at bar exempli-
fies the imprecision with which even the clearest test could be em-
ployed.65 Efficient administration of the distinction mandates a sep-
arate determination of the effects of each statute."
Even when it is recognized that the statute must be analyzed to
determine whether it was intended to place a mandatory condition
59. Id. at 221 & n.2, 249 A.2d at 344 & n.2. The issue before the Bellotti court was whether
the statute could be the basis of a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to PA. R.
Civ. P. 1034. In deciding that it could not, the court had to employ the same historical
distinction. See Goldman v. McShain, 432 Pa. 61, 247 A.2d 455 (1968); notes 116-25 and text
accompanying infra. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Fenton Storage Co. v. McClane, 154 Pa.
Super. 246, 35 A.2d 745 (1944); Swartz v. Great American Ins. Co., 65 York 91, 78 Pa. D. &
C. 376 (C.P. 1951).
60. Texas Truck Sleeper Co. v. Artman, 55 Westmoreland 13, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 663 (C.P.
1973); United Farmers Cooperative v. Zausner, 61 Lanc. L. Rev. 279 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
61. E.g., Brown v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42, 213 A.2d 342 (1965).
62. 54 Westmoreland 69, 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 166 (C.P. 1972).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953) (six year general statute of limitations).
64. All of these cases had dealt with the limitation for personal injuries, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 34 (1953): Ziemba v. Hagerty, 436 Pa. 179, 259 A.2d 876 (1969); Goldstein v. Stadler,
417 Pa. 589, 208 A.2d 850 (1965); Marucci v. Lippman, 406 Pa. 283, 177 A.2d 616 (1962);
Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R., 304 Pa. 294, 156 A. 89 (1931).
65. In Spanard v. Duquesne Light Co., 118 Pitt. L.J. 354 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. 1970), the
court similarly failed to appropriately determine whether the statute of limitations was non-
waivable. Citing Ziemba v. Hagerty, 436 Pa. 179, 259 A.2d 876 (1969), which dealt with PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953), the court held that id. § 31 was waivable.
66. E.g., Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131, 135, 289 A.2d 463, 466 (1972).
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upon recovery, the difficult task of statutory interpretation remains.
Since this process often results in inconsistent findings, it appears
arbitrary. A comparison of the statutory provisions and the relevant
interpretations thereof is illuminating. 7 These inconsistencies are
understandable, since the possibility that judicial articulation in
this regard accurately reflects the intention of the legislature is
slight. 8 Thus, even a well-advised court may have difficulties apply-
ing the historical distinction.
III. How TO PLEAD THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS OR STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS
The principles behind rules 1017, 1030, 1032, and 1045 may be
correlated into a few sentences. Any bar of the Statute of Frauds or
a statute of limitations which does not place a mandatory or sub-
stantive condition upon recovery must be pleaded69 and can only be
pleaded as an affirmative defense in new matter. 0 Those statutes
which independently condition recovery by requiring a showing of
67. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 3 (1967):
No action shall be brought ... to charge the defendant, upon any special promise,
to answer for the debt or default of another, unless the agreement upon which such
action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and
signed by the party to be charged therewith ....
Id. (emphasis added)(held "nonwaivable" in Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131, 289 A.2d 463
(1972)), with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.202 (1965):
Any such lease [longer than three years] must be in writing and signed by the
parties making or creating the same, otherwise it shall have the force and effect of a
lease at will only and shall not be given any greater force or effect either in law or equity
Id. (emphasis added) (held "waivable" in Blumer v. Dorfman, supra), and PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 34 (1953):
Every suit hereafter brought to recover damages for injury wrongfully done to the
person . . . must be brought within two years from the time when the injury was done
and not afterwards ....
Id. (emphasis addedi (held "waivable" in Ziemba v. Hagerty, 436 Pa. 179, 259 A.2d 876
(1969)).
68. Cf. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co. v. Lamp, 269 Pa. 517, 112 A. 679 (1921).
"Statutes, such as the one with which we are dealing, do not provide mere rules of evidence,
but are limitations upon the judicial authority to afford remedies." Id. at 520, 112 A. at 681
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
69. PA. R. Civ. P. 1032.
70. Id. 1017(b)(4), 1030, 1045. If thus properly pleaded it may form the basis for summary
judgment under PA. R. Civ. P. 1035, or where summary judgment is inappropriate, it may
become dispositive once the facts are found at trial. As to the possibility of invoking such a
defense on a motion for judgment on the pleadings under PA. R. Civ. P. 1034 see notes 116-
25 and text accompanying infra.
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compliance will not be waived if the party seeking the protection
fails to plead the statute,7 and can be raised as a preliminary objec-
tion in the nature of a demurrer72 or as an affirmative defense in new
matter.7 3 Choosing the permissible procedure in the given case ne-
cessitates a recognition and application of the historical distinction
adopted and endorsed by Brown v. Hahn.74 Where statutes of limita-
tion are concerned, the statute can be raised by preliminary objec-
tion if it is in the nature of a mandatory condition placed upon the
existence of the cause of action.7" Provisions of the Statute of Frauds
may be pleaded as preliminary objections when they are substan-
tive, placing upon the party attempting to enforce the oral agree-
ment the duty of showing that the statute has been fulfilled.7
Even under this test, care must be taken in deciding whether to
plead a particular statutory defense as a preliminary objection.
Many of the statutes have not been before the Pennsylvania appel-
late courts on this point, nor have they been interpreted to deter-
mine their nature and effect under the historical distinction. For
these, the choice between preliminary objection and affirmative de-
fense should be determined by reference to the interpretations of
analogous statutory language and a rational appraisal of the proce-
dural advantage of raising the statute preliminarily. Other statutes
will either have been before the courts on this question or a related
one requiring interpretation in accordance with the historical dis-
tinction. Where these statutes are concerned, reliance should be
placed only on those appellate cases accurately applying the histori-
71. This is so at least until the close of trial, because in the absence of a showing of
compliance, the complaint or counterclaim fails to state a sufficient claim upon which relief
can be granted. PA. R. Civ. P. 1032.
72. Id. 1017(b)(4).
73. Id. 1030, 1045. Such a statute could also serve as the basis for a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, id. 1034, or for summary judgment, id. 1035, or could be raised for the first
time at trial, id. 1032.
74. 419 Pa. 42, 213 A.2d 342 (1965). There should be no doubt that the rules intended to
adopt this distinction and the policy of Brown v. Hahn, supra. E.g., Blumer v. Dorfman, 447
Pa. 131, 136 n.4, 289 A.2d 463, 467 n.4 (1972); Ziemba v. Hagerty, 436 Pa. 179, 180-81, 259
A.2d 876 (1969).
75. E.g., Overmiller v. D.E. Horn & Co., 191 Pa. Super. 562, 159 A.2d 245 (1960); Swartz
v. Great American Ins. Co., 65 York 91, 78 Pa. D. & C. 376 (C.P. 1951). See also Common-
wealth ex rel. Fenton Storage Co. v. McClane, 154 Pa. Super. 246, 35 A.2d 745 (1944). Often
such statutes of limitations are labeled statutes of repose.
76. E.g., American Prods. Co. v. Refining Co., 275 Pa. 332, 119 A. 414 (1923); Mason-
Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie, 270 Pa. 221, 113 A. 202 (1921); Manufacturers Light & Heat Co. v.
Lamp, 269 Pa. 517, 112 A. 679 (1921); Brown v. Sheaffer, 93 Pa. Super. 246 (1928).
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cal distinction. In the discussion of various statutory defenses that
follows, attempt is made to point out the strength of the relevant
case law.
A. The Statutes of Limitations
The general six year statute of limitations77 has long been inter-
preted as a declaration of public policy78 giving the defendant a
permissive defense which will be waived if not pleaded." Having no
effect of itself, the statute cannot be raised as a preliminary objec-
tion.8o It is similarly held that the statute of limitations for personal
injuries" does not affect the right of recovery unless it is pleaded and
consequently cannot be raised by demurrer.82 The statute of limita-
tions for wrongful death actions 3 has been held to be a general
statute of limitations which does not condition the right of action; 84
thus it must be raised in the pleadings, and can only be raised as
an affirmative defense in new matter. Other statutes have been held
to be statutes of repose which can be raised at trial or by preliminary
objection. Among these are included the limitations for recovery of
workmen's compensation85 and the limitation for actions against
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953).
78. See Ulakovic v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 571, 16 A.2d 41 (1940).
79. E.g., Barclay v. Barclay, 206 Pa. 307, 55 A. 985 (1903); Carter v. Vandergrift, 74 Pa.
Super. 26 (1920); see Quaker City Chocolate & Confectionery Co. v. Delhi-Warnock Bldg.
Ass'n, 357 Pa. 307, 53 A.2d 597 (1947); accord, e.g., Allwein v. Wilt, 13 Lebanon 198 (Pa. C.P.
1971); contra, Yohey v. Lacoe, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 448 (C.P. Colum. Co. 1971).
80. PA. R. Civ. P. 1017(b)(4), 1030, 1045.
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
82. E.g., Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219, 249 A.2d 343 (1969); Stoltzfus v. Haus, 334 A.2d
738 (Pa. Super. 1975); Sykes v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 225 Pa. Super. 69, 310 A.2d
277 (1973). In Bellotti v. Spaeder, supra, the court noted, "The general statute of limitations
barring recovery in personal injury actions after the lapse of time is not a condition placed
by the law on a substantive right .... " 433 Pa. at 221 n.2, 249 A.2d at 344 n.2.
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1603 (1953).
84. Echon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 365 Pa. 529, 76 A.2d 175 (1950); Prettyman v. Irwin, 273
Pa. 522, 117 A. 195 (1922); accord, Roman v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 120 Pitt. L.J. 175, 56
Pa. D. & C.2d 687 (C.P. Allegh. Co. 1971); Rusch v. Evans, 53 Westmoreland 173 (Pa. C.P.
1971); contra, The Katahdin, 4 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Pa. 1933).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 602 (1952): Demmel v. Dilworth Co., 136 Pa. Super. 37, 7
A.2d 50 (1939). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 772 (1952): Harrington v. Mayflower Mfg. Co., 173
Pa. Super. 130, 96 A.2d 180 (1953). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 871 (1952): Overmiller v. D.E.
Horn & Co., 191 Pa. Super. 562, 159 A.2d 245 (1960).
It should be noted that cases under these statutes are not private party litigation and thus
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure may not be applicable. See Harrington v. May-
flower Mfg. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 130, 132, 96 A.2d 180, 181 (1953). Much of what has been
said in this comment may not apply to proceedings thereunder.
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sureties on constable bonds." However, the nature and effect of the
statute of limitations relating to sales of interests in real estate is
less clear.87
In Royal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Tunnelton Mining Co. ," the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that this statute of limitations could not
be raised by preliminary objection. Relying solely on Leister v.
Miller,"5 the court reasoned the statute was "waivable." The valid-
ity of the determination in Royal Oil thus depends in the first in-
stance upon the appropriateness of the court's reliance on Leister.
In Leister, the supreme court held that this statute of limitations
did not prevent a trustee from voluntarily performing an oral trust
after the period of limitations had expired. This holding was tripar-
tite and alternative: (1) the statute did not apply, since no action
had been brought to enforce the trust; (2) even if it did apply, the
one whom the statute was designed to protect, the holder of legal
title, could voluntarily waive its provisions; (3) even if it did apply
and could not be waived, the limitations period had not run.'"
Even assuming as in Leister's second assertion that this statute
of limitations could be voluntarily waived by the party it was de-
signed to protect, it does not necessarily follow that the statute
would be "waivable" in terms of the rules." To say that a party may
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 81 (1967): "Suits ... shall not be sustained, unless the same
shall be instituted within six years .... " Commonwealth ex rel. Fenton Storage Co. v.
McClane, 154 Pa. Super. 246, 35 A.2d 745 (1944).
Other statutes have been before the lower courts. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 44 (1953),
limiting the time within which an action for forfeiture can be brought, has been construed as
a statute of repose which can be raised as a preliminary objection. Commonwealth v. Musser
Forests, Inc., 70 Dauph. 385 (Pa. C.P. 1957). Similarly, the statute limiting the time within
which an action might be maintained against a constable or justice of the peace, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit 42, § 1017 (1966), has been held to be one which qualifies the substantive right and
which can be raised by demurrer. Kovachick v. Jennings, 27 Fay. L.J. 144, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d
25 (C.P. 1964); Sahd v. Kiscaden, 57 Lanc. L. Rev. 203 (Pa. C.P. 1960).
The statute of limitations provided by the Uniform Commercial Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12A, § 2-725 (1970), has not been before the Pennsylvania courts on this question, but it has
been determined that the statute is "procedural" for choice of law purposes, Natale v. Upjohn
Co., 356 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1966), and by analogy to the six year limitation for assumpsit, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953), will probablv be deemed "waivable" and raisable only as an
affirmative defense.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 83 (1953). This provision also regulates the enforcement of
an equity of redemption or an implied or resulting trust. The significant language is: "No
right of entry shall accrue, or action be maintained . . . but within five years .... " Id.
88. 444 Pa. 105, 282 A.2d 384 (1971).
89. 376 Pa. 452, 103 A.2d 656 (1954).
90. 376 Pa. at 455-56, 103 A.2d at 657-58.
91. See text accompanying notes 43-46 & 53-57 supra.
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perform the protected activity after the period of limitations has
expired without interference by the courts is to recognize a privilege
in that person. In contrast, when a statute is interpreted as being
"waivable" for pleading purposes, an obligation is imposed on the
protected party to plead the defense or lose its benefits. While a
party might be concurrently privileged and obliged in this manner,
it is at least clear that these inquiries must be made separately.
Another way of phrasing the issue is whether a party could have this
privilege of waiver under a "nonwaivable" statute. When a statute
is deemed "nonwaivable" under rules 1032 and 1017, it is inter-
preted as placing on the nonprotected party the obligation to show
compliance; the protected party is given the right until the close of
trial to require that this be done. There is no necessary effect on the
privilege of waiver; a statutory defense could be both "nonwaiva-
ble" and subject to voluntary relinquishment. There may be classes
of statutes, as suggested in Leister's third assertion, which prohibit
a party from performing the protected activity." In such a situation
the privilege of waiver would be lost. However, the statute involved
in Leister does not prohibit the protected party from performing the
agreement or trust. If he still has title to the property, he is the only
person who would be affected by a suit to enforce . 3 Thus it would
not be inconsistent to say that the statute could be waived voluntar-
ily by performance or conversely raised as a defense of law which
mandates that the party seeking enforcement meet its require-
ments. 4
It is apparent that Leister is not authority for the proposition that
this statute is waivable, and should not have been dispositive in
Royal Oil." To the contrary, in deciding that this statute of limita-
tions could not be raised by preliminary objection, the Royal Oil
court overlooked well-established case law which had determined
the statute was one of repose, designed to assure greater certainty
of title. 6 In these cases, it was reiterated that there could be "no
92. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 871 (1952) (Workmen's Compensation Act); see Over-
miller v. D.E. Horn & Co., 191 Pa. Super. 562, 159 A.2d 245 (1960).
93. See Way v. Hooton, 156 Pa. 8, 26 A. 784 (1893).
94. See Sferra v. Urling, 328 Pa. 161, 195 A. 422 (1937).
95. Moreover, in declaring that PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 83 (1953) could be voluntarily
waived, Leister relied only on cases which had held that a provision of the Statute of Frauds,
- PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2 (1967), could be voluntarily waived: Williams v. Moodhard, 341
Pa. 273, 19 A.2d 101 (1941); Faunce v. McCorkle, 321 Pa. 116, 183 A. 926 (1936).
96. Ross v. Suburban Counties Realty Corp., 356 Pa. 126, 51 A.2d 700 (1947); First Pool
1976
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right of action unless asserted in accordance with the provisions of
the statute."97 Consequently, it was held that the statute could be
invoked if not pleaded and taken advantage of by demurrer." The
diametric position asserted by the Royal Oil court is clearly incon-
sistent with this line of decisions applying the distinction endorsed
by Brown. The logical conclusion is that the-bar of this statute can
be pleaded as a preliminary objection when its applicability appears
on the face of the complaint or counterclaim.
B. The Statute of Frauds
Various though similar interpretations have been placed on those
statutes which collectively comprise the Statute of Frauds. The
statute relating to interests in realty99 has been deemed by many
supreme court cases to be a "waivable" defense and one which may
be raised only in new matter.' ° However, each has relied directly or
indirectly on Brown v. Hahn'0' which as pointed out previously, 02
did not analytically interpret the statute according to the historical
distinction that it purported to endorse. 03
Gas Coal Co. v. Wheeler Run Coal Co., 301 Pa. 485, 152 A. 685 (1930); Way v. Hooton, 156
Pa. 8, 26 A. 784 (1893); Douglass v. Lucas, 63 Pa. 9 (1869).
97. First Pool Gas Coal Co. v. Wheeler Run Coal Co., 301 Pa. 485, 489, 152 A. 685, 687
(1930).
98. E.g., id., citing American Prods. Co. v. Refining Co., 275 Pa. 332, 119 A. 414 (1923);
Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie, 270 Pa. 221, 113 A. 202 (1921).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1 (1967):
[Aill . . . interests of . . . lands . . . made or created . . . and not put in writing
• . . shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will only, and shall not, either
in law or equity, be deemed or taken to have any other or greater force or effect ....
100. See, e.g., Charles v. Henry, 334 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1975); Royal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Tunnelton Mining Co., 444 Pa. 105, 282 A.2d 384 (1971); Portnoy v. Brown, 430 Pa. 401, 243
A.2d 444 (1968).
101. 419 Pa. 42, 213 A.2d 342 (1965).
102. See notes 33-39 and text accompanying supra.
103. See Haskell v. Heathcote, 363 Pa. 184, 69 A.2d 71 (1949) (this statute is not a mere
rule of evidence but a limitation on judicial authority to provide a remedy), overruled, Brown
v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42, 213 A.2d 342 (1965); Brotman v. Brotman, 353 Pa. 570, 46 A.2d 175 (1946)
(this statute is more than a rule of evidence); Axe v. Potts, 349 Pa. 345, 37 A.2d 572 (1944)
(noncompliance with the statute renders the agreement unenforceable). It should be noted
however that each of these cases was before a "court of equity," and it was recognized that
the strict rules of common law pleading did not necessarily apply. See Atkinson, Pleading
the Statute of Limitations, 36 YALE L.J. 914, 922-25 (1927); Editorial Note, 30 W. VA. L.Q.
110, 112 (1924).
A derivative of this statute relating to leases, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.202 (1965), has
by analogy been held to be "waivable" and capable of being raised only as an affirmative
defense. Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131, 289 A.2d 463 (1972).
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Relating to parol trusts, no appellate opinions have been found
indicating whether the Statute of Frauds' 4 can be pleaded as a
preliminary objection or raised at trial if not pleaded. However, it
was determined long ago that this statute affirmatively requires a
writing in order that the parol trust be enforceable.' 5 Applying the
historical distinction it is reasonable to conclude that this statute
should be entitled to the special status accorded "nonwaivable"
acts. 106
Of limited application but of relative importance in this area is
the statute concerning promises to answer for the debt of another.0 7
Discussion of this statute in Leonard v. Martling'5 crystallized the
notion that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure had incorpo-
rated the historical distinction to allow "substantive" statutes to be
raised at trial if not pleaded. It was this statute which in Brown v.
Hahn'5 was exemplified as "nonwaivable." That this statute can be
raised as a preliminary objection is well established."10
There remains for discussion that section of the Statute of Frauds
relating to contracts for the sale of goods in excess of $500. In Penn-
sylvania, the governing statute is § 2-201 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code."' While no Pennsylvania appellate opinions have been
found determining whether this statute is nonwaivable for pleading
purposes, it is reasonable to conclude that it would be deemed so.
The current section is patterned after and is nearly identical to its
predecessor, § 4 of the Uniform Sales Act,"' which was held to
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2 (1967): "All declarations or creations of trusts.., of any
lands . . . shall be manifested by writing . . . or else to be void ....
105. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 234 Pa. 100, 83 A. 54 (1912).
106. But cf. Falkenstein v. Falkenstein, 92 Montg. 274, 279 (Pa. C.P. 1969).
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 3 (1967): "No action shall be brought ... to charge.
the defendant . . . to answer for the debt or default of another, unless the agreement upon
which such action shall be brought . . . shall be in writing .... "
108. 378 Pa. 339, 106 A.2d 585 (1954). See notes 19-26 and text accompanying supra.
109. 419 Pa. 42, 47-48, 213 A.2d 342, 344-45 (1965). See notes 31-32 and text accompanying
supra.
110. See generally Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131, 289 A.2d 463 (1972).
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-201 (1970):
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for
the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties . ...
Id. (emphasis added).
112. Sales Act of May 19, 1915, No. 241, § 4, [19151 Laws of Pa. 543:
A contract to sell or a sale of any goods . . . of the value of five hundred dollars or
1976
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render the contract unenforceable unless compliance could be
shown by the party seeking enforcement."3 Moreover, there is a
distinct likeness between the language of this section and that of
other provisions which have been deemed nonwaivable." 4 Lower
court cases indicate agreement with this conclusion."'
C. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
It is worthwhile to compare the procedure available under rule
1034,1 " which provides that a party may obtain a judgment on the
pleadings whenever this would be the proper remedy. This has been
described as an alternative demurrer, giving a party one additional
opportunity"7 to attack the sufficiency of the opponent's plead-
ings." '8 "Nonwaivable" statutes can be considered on review of the
pleadings since the judge at this stage may inquire whether the
complaint or counterclaim fails to state a cause of action."9 More
interesting, however, it is also proper to consider any admissions
upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the
goods . . . or give something . . . in part payment, or unless some note or memoran-
dum in writing of the contract or sale be signed ....
Id. (emphasis added).
113. E.g., American Prods. Co. v. Refining Co., 275 Pa. 332, 119 A. 414 (1923); Manufac-
turers Light & Heat Co. v. Lamp, 269 Pa. 517, 112 A. 679 (1921); Brown v. Sheaffer, 93 Pa.
Super. 246 (1928). See also Leonard v. Martling, 378 Pa. 339, 106 A.2d 585 (1954); Martin v.
Wilson, 371 Pa. 529, 92 A.2d 193 (1952).
114. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-201(1) (1970): "[A] contract ... is not
enfVrceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing. ... with PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 3 (1967): "No action shall be brought ... unless the agreement. . . shall be
in writing .... " In each case, the statute proceeds with a negative mandate, and eases this
by nevertheless permitting enforcement if a writing exists. The latter statute has been
deemed nonwaivable by application of the historical distinction. See notes 107-10 and text
accompanying supra.
115. Texas Truck Sleeper Co. v. Artman, 55 Westmoreland 13, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 663 (C.P.
1973); United Farmers Cooperative v. Zausner, 61 Lanc. L. Rev. 279 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
In Behrman & Passell, Inc. v. Amberson Gardens, Inc., 111 Pitt. L.J. 287 (Pa. C.P. Allegh.
Co. 1963), Judge Aldisert held that PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 8-319 (1970), the Statute of
Frauds relating to a sale of securities, was a total and complete defense which could be raised
by preliminary objection.
116. PA. R. Civ. P. 1034.
117. However, a party cannot move for a judgment on the pleadings if no new pleadings
have been filed and his preliminary objection to the same effect was overruled on the merits.
See Penn Sec. Co. v. Sacco, 41 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 101, 102-03 (Pa. C.P. 1950); cf. Dunn v.
Orloff, 414 Pa. 636, 201 A.2d 432 (1964); Chivers v. School Dist., 6 Pa. Commw. 622, 297 A.2d
187 (1972).
118. 1 GOODRICH-AMRAM, supra note 40, §§ 1034(a)-1 to -2 (1962).
119. See, e.g., Goldman v. McShain, 432 Pa. 61, 72-73, 247 A.2d 455, 460-61 (1968).
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made by the opposing party in his pleadings. 20 Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the plaintiff alleges a cause of action for personal injury,
setting forth facts which clearly indicate that the statute of limita-
tions"2 ' would be a bar to the action. In new matter, the defendant
raises this statute as a defense, and endorses his answer with a
notice to plead. 22 If the plaintiff fails to respond indicating that the
statute is inapplicable, the defense is admitted. 3 If the defense is
admitted, it may be taken advantage of on motion for judgment on
the pleadings irrespective of the independent effect which the stat-
ute might or might not have on the cause of action.2 4 In practical
effect, any bar of the Statute of Frauds or statute of limitations
which appears on the face of the complaint or counterclaim and
which cannot be factually denied will be dispositive on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. However, since a motion pursuant to
rule 1034 cannot be made until the pleadings are closed,'25 the pre-,
vailing party will nevertheless have had to present the entire defense
in the answer and new matter; this presentation appears unneces-
sarily dilatory and inefficient.
IV. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. The Practical View
The foregoing discussion has illustrated various difficulties inher-
ent in the current system of pleading. In advocating reform it is
appropriate to emphasize that these problems arise from the choice
to distinguish similar statutes by means of a conceptual analysis
which is often difficult to understand and apply. These problems of
application have been accentuated by two related holdings of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. At one time it had been held that
120. Id. at 73, 247 A.2d at 461. See also Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131, 139-40, 289 A.2d
463, 468-69 (1972); Bata v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 423 Pa. 373, 378, 224 A.2d 174, 178
(1966).
121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
122. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1026, 1041.
123. Id. 1045(b). See also id. 1029.
124. See Goldman v. McShain, 432 Pa. 61, 73, 247 A.2d 455, 461 (1968); Bermudez v.
PTC, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 462 (C.P. Phila. Co. 1973); Pierro v. Pierro, 19 Bucks 268 (Pa. C.P.
1969). When the defense is not admitted in this way, the statute can be effective on such a
motion only if it is "nonwaivable." Goldman v. McShain, supra.
125. PA. R. Civ. P. 1034.
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a party could waive the procedural irregularity which occurred when
a "waivable" statute was raised by preliminary objection, by failing
to object to the irregularity. 2 ' Royal Oil,1"7 however, held that the
procedure laid down by rules 1017(b), 1030 and 1045(b) is manda-
tory and that such procedural irregularities could not be waived by
the parties. Similarly, the supreme court was once willing to con-
sider the merits of waivable defenses even though the basis of appeal
was procedural irregularity, as where the defense was improperly
raised by preliminary objection.' This expediting practice is no
longer followed.'29 That these developments have attempted to en-
courage conscientious practice is commendable, but it must be real-
ized that an ancillary result may be to discourage the practice of
pleading such statutes preliminarily.
Rule 1017(b)(4) establishes a desirable preliminary procedure.
Yet, the subtleties of applying the historic distinction may discour-
age the rule's usage in appropriate situations. The attorney who is
unsure of the nature of the applicable statute or who has no time to
research this point will raise the legal defense in new matter; this is
acceptable and at times may be tactically wise, but it foregoes the
available benefits of pleading the defense preliminarily. Judges who
are in doubt may tend to overrule preliminary objections and re-
quire that the defense be raised in new matter, reasoning no party
is prejudiced thereby. Given the average case load, the possibility
of judicial error even when the issue is addressed is not so insignifi-
cant as to be ignored. The practical result may be a narrowly cir-
cumscribed procedure which is further restrained by the effects of
its own inadequacies.
B. Efficiency as a Unifying Purpose for Procedures
It seems elementary to efficient pretrial disposition of disputes
that applicable defenses be raised as soon as practicable, and if their
applicability is uncontroverted, that they dispose of the case with-
out delay. 30 This principle of efficiency underlies rule 1017(b)(4). By
126. E.g., Yefko v. Ochs, 437 Pa. 233, 263 A.2d 416 (1970).
127. Royal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Tunnelton Mining Co., 444 Pa. 105, 282 A.2d 384 (1971).
128. "Nothing is to be gained by sending the parties back to the trial court to set their
procedural house in order before coming once again to this Court with the identical contro-
versy." Brown v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42, 50, 213 A.2d 342, 346 (1965). See also Callery v. Blyth
Twp. Mun. Auth., 432 Pa. 307, 243 A.2d 385 (1968) (res judicata improperly pleaded).
129. E.g., Ziemba v. Hagerty, 436 Pa. 179, 259 A.2d 876, rev'g 214 Pa. Super. 381, 261
A.2d 342 (1969); Portnoy v. Brown, 430 Pa. 401, 407, 243 A.2d 444, 448 (1968).
130. See, e.g., F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 2, 132-33 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Vol. 14: 399
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permitting a party to raise certain defenses as objections this rule
saves the parties and the judicial system the cost and effort of pro-
tracted proceedings the outcome of which can be determined pre-
liminarily.'3 ' Administrative efficiency will be served, however, if
any statute of limitations or provision of the Statute of Frauds could
be raised preliminarily when clearly applicable. The reason for the
exception afforded by rule 1017(b)(4) would apply regardless of the
nature and effect of the statutory bar.
It is true, as it has been suggested,'32 that a defending party may
avail himself of any statutory provision by moving for summary
judgment under rule 1035'31 and as discussed above,'34 by moving in
certain circumstances for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
rule 1034. Nevertheless, these procedures are not the most efficient
methods of raising a legal defense which clearly appears on the face
of the claim; both require that the entire defense be set forth. Even
when a statutory defense is a clear bar, most attorneys may feel
compelled to allege all alternative defenses, both of law and of fact,
in the answer and new matter. Since these may not be necessary,
potential if not real inefficiency results. Moreover, to argue that the
summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings procedure satis-
factorily permits attorneys to raise "waivable" statutory defenses
implies that there is no need for the preliminary objection proce-
dure.
JAMES]; Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of Limitations, 36 YALE L.J. 914, 918 (1927).
Under some systems of procedure, e.g., the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is an
apparent tension between the rules governing the sufficiency of the complaint, which require
only "notice" of a cause of action, and those governing dismissal upon failure to provide
such notice. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), with FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). The willingness of
courts to dismiss an action preliminarily is accordingly dependent upon the degree of specific-
ity required of the pleadings as well as the availability of amendment as of course.
131. [Tlhis Court has repeatedly and wisely sustained preliminary objections
where plaintiffs complaint or pleading shows on its face that his claim is devoid of
merit. This is wise, because if the law or the rule were otherwise, it would mean long
and unnecessary delays in the law-delays which Courts are strenuously trying to
eliminate or reduce-and it could not aid plaintiff at the trial or affect the result. ...
Greenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 427 Pa. 511, 518, 235 A.2d 576, 579 (1967) (citations omitted).
132. Mangino v. Steel Contracting Co., 427 Pa. 533, 534, 235 A.2d 151, 152 (1967); Green-
berg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 427 Pa. 511, 521, 235 A.2d 576, 581-82 (1967) (Jones, J., dissenting);
id. at 523-24, 235 A.2d 580 (Cohen, J., dissenting). These assertions may evidence a sense of
pride in the recent institution of the summary judgment procedure in Pennyslvania. See
Arensberg, Summary Judgment: Partial Cure for Delay?, 33 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 278 (1962).
133. PA. R. Cirv. P. 1035.
134. See notes 116-25 and text accompanying supra.
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The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure have attempted to
further administrative efficiency by the adoption of a legal fiction
designed to accord certain statutory defenses a preferred status.35
This choice was made to exact the most from the traditionally lim-
ited conception of the demurrer. Only when a defense operated such
that the complaint failed to state a legally sufficient cause of action
could it be the basis of a demurrer. The demurrer, though, differs
greatly from its common law origins,"6 and it should be open to
question whether its inherent limitations should proscribe the pro-
cedures to be followed today. "As we know, a great deal of legal
reform [has come] through the use of legal fictions."' 37 The tool
adopted by the rules, the nature and effect of the statute, has as its
only purpose procedural efficiency. It is time to discard this fiction,
for its function of pointing out the efficiency which can be realized
is complete. Procedural reform in this instance must take as its
primary goal and only restraint the efficient administration of jus-
tice. 31
C. Suggested Reform
It is proposed that a procedure be established which will allow a
party to raise any affirmative defense by preliminary objection
when "the applicability of [the defense] appears on the face of the
complaint or counterclaim.' ' 39 If not controverted by a proper
amendment to the statement of claim, 139 ' the objection would be
sustained. So long as the complainant is afforded the opportunity
through amendment to raise any potential reply to an affirmative
defense, procedural efficiency would be maximized by preliminary
135. It is worthwhile to compare the federal system, where the same problem exists, and
where the courts have no identifiable tool to work with. The cases are divided as to whether
the defenses of a statute of limitations or the Statute of Frauds can be raised on a motion to
dismiss pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), roughly equivalent to the Pennsylvania prelimi-
nary objection procedure. See generally 35B C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure §§ 814, 817 (1960).
136. See JAMES, supra note 130, at 127-28. At early common law, the demurrer was treated
as a final disposition of the case, whatever the outcome. Today, its procedural effectiveness
has been diluted by enactments permitting the amendment of a defective complaint or the
pleading over of the defense.
137. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. L.J. 177, 195 (1958).
138. See generally R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS passim (1971).
139. PA. R. Civ. P. 1017(b)(4).
139.1. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1028(c).
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disposition of the case.'40 An example of the operation of such a
procedure under differing factual assumptions is noted below.'4' All
other characteristics of the preliminary objection and related proce-
dures would remain unchanged. For instance, no defense could be
140. See JAMES, supra note 130, at 132-33.
141. The following hypothetical will be helpful in explaining the operation of such a
procedure as applied to the defense of the statute of limitations. It is assumed that no facts
exist which might toll the running of the statute.
Plaintiff A alleges in his complaint that on May 1, 1971, defendant B physically assaulted
him. The complaint was filed on June 15, 1973, but can be considered otherwise sufficient. B
files a preliminary objection on the basis of the two year statute of limitations for personal
injuries, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
If the facts are as alleged, there is no reason why the complaint should not be dismissed
preliminarily. Requiring the defendant to plead the defense affirmatively only subjects all
concerned, both parties and the courts, to unnecessary delay, expenditure of time and ex-
pense. This is particularly so because it requires the defendant to prepare his answer on the
merits, and postpones the decision of the court to the more involved summary judgment
procedure.
If the facts are not as alleged, determination hinges upon the actual facts not alleged. Had
a simple mistake been made in the typing of the complaint, A would be permitted to corre-
spondingly amend the pleading by addition of the appropriate date (e.g., May 1, 1972). This
would be so even if the amendment took place more than two years subsequent to the actual
date of the occurrence, since no new cause of action would have been set up. Bata v. Central-
Penn Nat'l Bank, 448 Pa. 355, 293 A.2d 343 (1972); Saracina v. Cotoia, 417 Pa. 80, 208 A.2d
764 (1965); see PA. R. Civ. P. 1033. Once this amended pleading is filed, B's preliminary
objection on the basis of the statute of limitations would be inapplicable and thus dismissed.
If the facts were as pleaded, but in addition, B had assaulted A on May 1, 1972, then the
appropriateness of the amendment would depend upon the timing of the amendment, since
the amended pleading would allege a new cause of action. If filed before May 1, 1974, the
amendment would be permitted since the additional cause of action would have been filed
within the two year limitation period. In such a case, the preliminary objection would simi-
larly have to be overruled since the complaint as amended alleged a sufficient claim. If the
amendment were to be filed subsequent to May 1, 1974, then under rule 1033 and Bata it
could not be accepted, for it would be alleging a new cause of action after the limitation
applicable thereto had run. In this case, there would again be no reason for requiring that B
wait to replead the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, for the reasons outlined
above. Moreover, it would seem particularly inconsistent to recognize the running of a later
period of limitations by refusing amendment while ignoring at the same procedural stage the
running of an earlier one by refusing to consider it on preliminary objection. As to amend-
ments and what constitutes a new cause of action, see Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton
Corp., 457 Pa. 135, 319 A.2d 914 (1974); Sykes v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 225 Pa.
Super. 69, 310 A.2d 277 (1973).
Where a bar of the Statute of Frauds is involved, the application of the suggested procedure
is even simpler. In such a situation, the objection based on the statutory bar appearing on
the face of the claim would be sustained unless the plaintiff could move to amend the
statement of claim to allege facts which would take the case out of the statute.
These illustrations merely reflect current practice under liberal rules of amendment; the
only change is that the case is either clarified or disposed of earlier-the goal of efficient
pretrial procedures.
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sustained by this amended procedure unless the case were clear and
free from all doubt. 42
A brief glance at practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure will illustrate the willingness of many courts to broadly deter-
mine when a complaint fails to set forth an adequate claim. Rule
12(b)(6) 4I provides that the defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted may be raised by a motion to dismiss.
The prevailing view is that the affirmative defense of any statute of
limitations or the Statute of Frauds may be raised by such a motion
if there is no question of fact as to the existence of the defense.'
No conceptual distinction based upon the nature of the act is em-
ployed;"' instead the emphasis is upon whether a valid legal defense
will defeat the right of recovery.'46 It is often said that rule 9(f), 47
which makes time a material allegation, allows a party to test the
sufficiency of a pleading under rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of the
statute of limitations. 4 ' For the Statute of Frauds, it is similarly
reasoned that allowing such a defense to be raised under rule
12(b) (6) when the claim indicates its application is the more logical
procedure."'
The Pennsylvania courts have been willing to consider the
broader effects occasioned by raising certain other affirmative de-
142. E.g., Adams v. Speckman, 385 Pa. 308, 122 A.2d 685 (1956). If any factual issues
arise out of the amendment of the statement of claim, disposition thereof should await trial
or, where appropriate, summary judgment proceedings. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
144. E.g., Sherwin v. Oil City Nat'l Bank, 18 F.R.D. 188 (W.D. Pa. 1955) (statute of
limitations); see, e.g., Hanna v. United States Veterans' Admin. Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092 (3d
Cir. 1975) (statute of limitations); Continental Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir.
1942) (Statute of Frauds); Patitucci v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Pa. 1959)
(statute of limitations); Cohen v. Johnson, 8 F.R.D. 37 (M.D. Pa. 1948) (Statute of Frauds).
145. But see, e.g., Sikes v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
146. E.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 429 (D. Del. 1973).
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(f).
148. E.g., Hanna v. United States Veterans' Admin. Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir.
1975); Sherwin v. Oil City Nat'l Bank, 18 F.R.D. 188 (W.D. Pa. 1956). Compare PA. R. Civ.
P. 1019(f), which provides that averments of time shall be specifically stated in the pleadings.
See also Barclay v. Barclay, 206 Pa. 307, 310, 55 A. 985, 986 (1903), where the court states:
"The statute of limitations is a defense upon facts, and must be pleaded. It cannot be made
by a demurrer which raises only an issue of law." The Barclay case has played a significant
role in the development and application of the historical distinction in Pennyslvania pleading
practice. See, e.g., Editorial Note, 30 W. VA. L.Q. 110, 111 n.5 (1924).
149. E.g., Continental Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635-36 (3d Cir. 1942). In Penn-
sylvania, claims based on a writing must give notice of the fact and attach a copy if available;
otherwise the court may assume there is no writing as the basis of the action. See PA. R. Civ.
P. 1019(h).
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fenses. "It is settled that laches may be raised and determined by
preliminary objection if laches clearly appears in the complaint."'" °
The affirmative defense of res judicata may be raised and deter-
mined by preliminary objection where "the plaintiffs' complaint
sets forth in detail, either directly or by reference, the facts and
issues pleaded by the prior suit."' 5 Neither of these defenses affirm-
atively conditions the right of recovery nor renders the complaint
prima facie insufficient; both will be waived under rule 1032 if not
pleaded. 5 2 By condoning the practice of sustaining these defenses
on preliminary objection, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
adopted in principle the functional approach towards preliminary
objections espoused in this comment.
Adoption of the preliminary objection procedure suggested herein
may not entirely forego the need for the historic distinction and its
accompanying difficulties. Some standard will still be needed to
determine which statutes can be raised at trial if not pleaded.'5
Assuming that the historical distinction is appropriate for this pur-
pose, this partial justification for its existence does not establish the
desirability of its continued use under rule 1017. Whether a particu-
lar statute is "waivable" or "nonwaivable" hardly seems the proper
test for determining the permissible time of pleading, for the valid-
ity of a party's choice will not be in issue unless the statute has been
pleaded as a preliminary objection and therefore not waived.5 4 If not
employed in the preliminary objection procedure, the confusion
caused by the distinction will not discourage attorneys from pro-
perly invoking this procedural stage; the difficult question of
150. Holiday Lounge, Inc. v. Shaler Enterprises Corp., 441 Pa. 201, 204, 272 A.2d 175, 177
(1971) (citations omitted). But see Rose Tree Media School Dist. v. Department of Pub.
Instruction, 431 Pa. 233, 238-39, 244 A.2d 754, 756 (1968).
151. Kiely v. Cunningham Equip., Inc., 387 Pa. 598, 601-02, 128 A.2d 759, 760 (1957). See
also Greenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 427 Pa. 511, 235 A.2d 576 (1967); Chivers v. School Dist., 6
Pa. Commw. 622, 297 A.2d 187 (1972).
152. See Posternack v. American Cas. Co., 421 Pa. 21, 218 A.2d 350 (1966) (defense of res
judicata will be waived under rule 1032 if not pleaded); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Brownstein,
182 Pa. Super. 65, 125 A.2d 618 (1956) (defense of laches must be pleaded); Lang v. Recht,
171 Pa. Super. 605, 91 A.2d 313 (1952) (res judicata is waived if not pleaded).
153. PA. R. Civ. P. 1032.
154. The reply to this rhetorical statement is, of course, that the use of the historical
distinction under rule 1017 is but a tool to find those statutes which by their mandatory or
substantive nature result in a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. PA.
R. Civ. P. 1032. If the limited perception of the demurrer is retained as that which governs
the scope of a preliminary objection, the distinction and its difficulties must also be retained.
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whether a statute is "nonwaivable" under rule 1032 will only be
before the trial court when the defense. has been overlooked. In
short, by limiting the distinction to true waiver situations, the diffi-
culties inherent in its application will arise less frequently and only
upon necessity.
V. CONCLUSION
There is an admitted jurisprudential need for an analytical under-
standing of the nature and effect of a statutory defense. Neverthe-
less, there is no justification for employing such an analysis of the
substantive law to determine the pleading procedures to be fol-
lowed. Every affirmative defense which is legally cognizable will,
upon proof of the operative facts and invocation by the defendant,
have legal significance. When the plaintiff alleges those very facts
and defendant raises the defense, litigation should terminate unless
avoidance is possible through amendment.
Consideration should be given to adopting a procedure which, like
the one suggested here, focuses preliminarily upon whether a valid
legal defense will defeat the alleged right of recovery. But if change
is not desired by those with the power to effect it, further clarifica-
tion of the present procedures is essential to aid courts and advo-
cates in their application of the conceptual distinction incorporated
into the rules.
ANDREW M. ROMAN
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